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MONTANA
Stephen R. Brown
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, Montana produced nearly twenty-three million barrels of
crude oil, up slightly from its 2018 production,1 and 48.5 million cubic
feet of natural gas.2 Through mid-2020, both crude oil and natural gas
production declined by more than 25% when compared to the same
period in 2012.3

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.7
1. Crude
Oil
Production,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm
[https://perma.cc/TE2B-ZXBB].
2. Montana Natural Gas Withdrawals, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9010mt2a.htm [https://perma.cc/768H-SFLV].
3. See Montana Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPMT2&f=
M [https://perma.cc/JYT8-EBNK] (displaying the annual crude oil production and
the decrease in crude oil production through June 2020); See U.S. natural gas
production
(gross
withdrawals),
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/production/#ng-tab
[https://perma.cc/N9ZUM3LV] (follow: tab option on the screen to “Montana”) (indicating the decrease in
natural gas production).

382

2021]

MONTANA

383

II. MONTANA SUPREME COURT
The Montana Supreme Court only decided one oil and gas case in
the last year—Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC. However, it was
relatively significant because it clarified the test used in Montana to
determine what is included in a grant or reservation of “other
minerals.”
A. Background
Beginning in 2005, Mary Ann and Lige Murray discovered
several unique dinosaur fossils on their ranch in eastern Montana. The
fossils included the remains of two dinosaurs locked in combat, a
nearly complete Tyrannosaurus rex, and several intact Triceratops
parts. Each fossil has significant scientific and financial value.
The Murrays own all of the surface estate on their property but only
a minority interest in the mineral estate. The mineral estate was split
from the surface estate in a mineral deed that stated, “[a]ll right title
and interest in and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in,
on and under, and that many be produced from [the described
property] . . . .”4 Two entities, including BEJ Minerals, LLC (“BEJ”),
ultimately owned the majority of the mineral interest. A dispute arose
when the Murrays notified the other mineral interest owners of the
fossil finds, as they were required to do under the terms of the purchase
contract for their ranch. BEJ claimed the fossils fell within the
definition of “minerals” under the terms of the deed and were not part
of the Murrays’ surface estate interest. (BEJ did not dispute that the
Murrays owned a minority share of the mineral interest.) The Murrays
disagreed and filed suit in Montana state district court seeking a
declaratory judgment that the fossils were part of the surface estate.
The Murrays’ filing started a long procedural journey for the
dispute. BEJ removed the case to federal court based on diversity. The
federal district court ruled that the dinosaur fossils were part of the
surface estate.5 BEJ appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that fossils were not part of the surface estate. 6 The

4. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 81 (Mont. 2020).
5. Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Mont.
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437
(9th Cir. 2018), on reh’g en banc, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying question
to, 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80.
6. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, 908 F.3d 437, 447–48 (9th Cir. 2018), on reh’g en
banc, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying question to, 464 P.3d 80.
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Murrays asked for en banc review, which the Ninth Circuit granted.7
As reported in the update last year, due to important public policy
ramifications for Montana,8 the Ninth Circuit then certified to the
Montana Supreme Court the question of whether dinosaur fossils fall
within the scope of the term “minerals” when used in a mineral
reservation. In Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, the Montana Supreme
Court held they do not.
The Montana Supreme Court articulated and applied a three-factor
test to provide the necessary “contextual cues” as to whether “a
substance fits within the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘mineral.”9
First, the Court examined the scope of the term “minerals” as used in
the deed and whether dinosaur fossils fit within the term. Next, the
Court evaluated whether the mineral composition of the material
makes it rare and valuable. Finally, the Court looked to the relationship
to and effect on the surface when the material is removed. This threefactor test had not previously been used in Montana to evaluate the
term “mineral” in a deed or reservation.10
B. Majority Opinion
The Court spent the majority of its analysis on the first factor,
seeking to determine the mutual intent of the parties when they drafted
the deed as is required by Montana statute.11 The Court applied this
factor in a general sense because there was no indication in the factual
record that the parties specifically contemplated ownership of
dinosaur fossils when they drafted the mineral deed.12 The Court noted
that the materials specifically mentioned in the deed (oil, gas, and
hydrocarbons) typically are “mined for further refinement and
economic exploitation” while fossils are not.13 The Court then
surveyed several Montana statutes that define the term “mineral” for
various permitting and reclamation purposes. Although these
definitions refer to various examples, none mention fossils. The Court

7. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 2019) (order
granting en banc).
8. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2019) (en
banc).
9. Murray, 464 P.3d at 84.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 84–90; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-301 (2019).
12. Murray, 464 P.3d at 87.
13. Id.
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then identified several instances in Montana statutes where fossils are
mentioned but only in a non-economic sense.14
The Court also visited its decision in Carbon County v. Union
Reserve Coal Co., where it held that coal seam gas was not within the
scope of the terms “coal and coal rights” when used in an instrument.15
The Court noted with approval that under Carbon County and the
maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius,16 the grant of specific
minerals (i.e. coal and coal rights) does not imply the grant of all
minerals.17 Based upon all these interpretive tools, the Court
concluded that in the context of a “general mineral reservation deed,”
the “language identifying ‘mineral’ would not ordinarily and naturally
include fossils.”18
Even though it arguably could have finished its analysis with its
conclusion that fossils are not minerals in this type of deed, the Court
proceeded to its second factor. The Court found that the “rarity and
value of dinosaur fossils” is “not a circumstance of their mineral
composition and consequent usefulness for refinement and economic
exploitation.”19 This factor therefore supported the conclusion that
fossils are not minerals. As precedent, the Court looked to two
Montana cases, where it previously ruled that substances that are
“minerals” in a scientific sense are not minerals for purposes of a
general reference in an instrument, primarily because they are too
common. The first involved the use of scoria for roadbuilding
material.20 The second involved sandstone that did not have to be
“changed, refined, or processed to be used commercially.”21 Both
cases in turn relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Heinatz
v. Allen22—a 1949 case holding that limestone ordinarily is not a
mineral. In Heinatz, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that:
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not
minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the
word unless they are rare and exceptional in character
14. Id.
15. Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 688 (Mont. 1995).
16. As defined by the Court, “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another,” Id. 271 Mont. at 466, 898 P.2d at 684.
17. Murray, 464 P.3d at 86.
18. Id. at 90.
19. Id. at 92.
20. Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 378–79 (Mont.
1995).
21. Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009).
22. Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (Tex. 1949).
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or possess a peculiar property giving them special
value, as for example sand that is valuable for making
glass and limestone of such quality that it may
profitable be manufactured into cement.23
In applying this factor, the Murray Court did not focus on the
“character” or “particular property” of dinosaur fossils but instead on
whether the material has a composition that can be usefully refined
and exploited economically. The Court concluded fossils do not, and
therefore they are not rare and exceptional.
The Murray Court’s final factor looked to how dinosaur fossils
relate to the surface of the land and the “method and effect” of
removing them.24 The Court concluded that because fossils are
“excavated” from the ground and not “mined,” they are similar to the
limestone at issue in Heinatz. Therefore, the Court weighed against
interpreting the fossils to be “minerals” within the scope of the deed.25
C. Dissenting Opinion
Three justices dissented. They concluded that because dinosaur
fossils met the scientific definition of “mineral,” all that is left is a
determination of whether the fossils have rare and exceptional
qualities. The dissent then argued that the focus should be on these
particular fossils, not fossils in general. Because it is “abundantly clear
these fossils are rare, exceptional, and valuable,” the dissent concluded
that Montana law dictates that they must be “minerals” as that term
was used in the deed.26 The dissent strongly disagreed with the
majority’s addition of the surface destruction factor, arguing it lacked
any precedential basis.27
D. Analysis
Based on the first factor, the Court gave a well-reasoned analysis of
why dinosaur fossils do not fall within the accepted use of the term
“minerals.” The Murray Court thoroughly reviewed Montana statutes,
case law, and regulatory interpretations to ultimately conclude the
term “minerals” when used in a deed “would not ordinarily and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 997.
Murray, 464 P.3d at 92.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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naturally include fossils.”28 At that point, the Court could have ended
its inquiry because if fossils are not “minerals” as commonly
understood, there was no reason to conduct an inquiry into whether
the fossils are “rare and valuable” or can be collected without
disturbing the surface. The Court’s analysis of the second and third
factors arguably raises more question than it answers.
Ending the inquiry at fossils not being minerals arguably would not
conflict with Montana precedent. If the scoria and sandstone at issue
in the prior Montana cases were filtered through the Court’s “ordinary
and natural” usage analysis, they both would technically be minerals,
which then justifies the additional inquiry of whether either had some
particular property that differentiated them from other scoria,
sandstone, or common materials. The Texas Supreme Court followed
this approach in Heinatz when it concluded that limestone could be a
“mineral” under an instrument in some instances but was not in that
particular case because it had no use other than as common building
material.29
The prior Montana cases and the Texas court in Heinatz indicate
that the analysis moves to the “rare and valuable” step after a finding
that a material is a mineral but is more like soil or construction
material, thereby justifying further inquiry.30 Additionally and
somewhat analogously, under the Surface Resources Act, the United
States recognizes uncommon varieties of certain minerals when the
mineral deposit has some property giving it “distinct and special
value.”31
Unfortunately, the Montana Court strays from these cases by its
focus on what can be refined and economically exploited from the
mineral composition of the material. The Court seems to have tried to
make the test fit the facts, which inadvertently could cause some
materials to not be minerals when they otherwise would be under the
Heinatz line of cases. The Court cited no case where the “rare and
valuable” or some similar test had been applied to fossils, and it does
28. Id. at 90.
29. Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Tex. 1949).
30. See, e.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Com’n of Wyo., 757
P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988) (gravel not part of mineral estate); Holland v. Dolese Co.,
540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975) (limestone); Kinney v. Keith, 128 P.3d 297 (Colo. App.
2005) (sand and gravel); George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word Minerals, 54
N.D. L. REV. 419 (1977).
31. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2012); see, e.g., Pitkin Iron Corp. v. Kempthorne, 554 F.
Supp. 2d 1208, 1208 (D. Colo. 2008); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Anderson, 629
P.2d 512, 512 (Alaska 1981); McClarty v. Sec’y of Interior, 408 F.2d 907, 907 (9th
Cir. 1969) (outlining 5-factor test).
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not appear to have been necessary for the Court to do so here,
especially in light of its conclusion under the first factor.
The third factor identified by the Court is probably the most
problematic. The Court identified no prior Montana court that relied
on the effect of surface extraction but instead only cited Texas law as
applied in Heinatz as precedent. However, the Court failed to
recognize that Texas law has evolved significantly since 1949 when
Heinatz was decided. Specifically, in Moser v. United States Steel
Corp,32 the Texas Supreme Court rejected surface destruction as a
factor in determining whether a substance is a “mineral” for purposes
of a grant or reservation. Instead, the Court held that uranium, which
may require surface destruction to extract, still may be a mineral.
The Montana Supreme Court could have easily relied on Moser for
its decision and reached the same result, while at the same time
simplifying Montana law going forward.33 In Moser, the Texas Court
looked to the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the term “mineral”
rather than either a surface destruction test or what was known about
the value of a mineral at the time of its severance.34 This is similar to
the analysis used by the Montana Court in its evaluation of the first
factor. In other words, while uranium is commonly understood to be a
mineral, dinosaur fossils are not. No party cited any case from
Montana or any other jurisdiction where dinosaur fossils fall within a
generic reference to “minerals” in an instrument.
Ultimately, the inclusion of the surface destruction factor may
lead Montana down a road of fewer substances being within the scope
of the term “mineral.” For instance, if a rare mineral was discovered
close to the surface of property, the Court’s analysis suggests it may
not be a “mineral” reserved or granted by an instrument, even if the
material is commonly understood as a mineral and is rare and valuable
if its extraction destroys the surface.
The surface destruction factor also leads to potential confusion
because it forces a fine distinction between the “surface estate” and
the “surface of the land.” Montana recognizes that the surface estate
may include aspects of property, such as pore space thousands of feet
below the physical surface of the land.35 Essentially, the surface estate
32. Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984).
33. The Montana Supreme Court previously has cited Moser with approval in a
decision holding that pore space is part of the surface estate, not the mineral estate.
Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Lang & Sons, Inc., 259 P.3d 766, 770 (Mont.
2011).
34. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102.
35. Burlington, 259 P.3d at 770.
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is everything that is not part of the mineral estate. If destruction of the
surface estate is a component of determining whether something is
part of the surface estate, it would potentially lead to a circular
analysis. The Montana Supreme Court potentially raised this concern
by incorrectly equating the terms “surface of the land” and “surface
estate” in its analysis.36
In a narrow sense, the Murray decision puts to rest the question in
Montana of whether dinosaur fossils are minerals. If these fossils fail
to meet the mineral test, it is difficult to imagine how any others ever
could. Moreover, the Montana Legislature has, at least prospectively,
removed any ambiguity by legislating that fossils are not minerals
unless specifically mentioned in a deed.37 However, by expanding the
rare and valuable factor beyond its traditional use as a test for
widespread mineral materials, and by adding a surface destruction
factor that has fallen out of favor in other states, the Court may have
unnecessarily added some uncertainty when determining the scope of
a grant or reservation of “minerals,” which ultimately may make title
examination in Montana less certain.
III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF MONTANA
A. Wildearth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land
Management
Wildearth Guardians (“Wildearth”) challenged the United States
Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) decision to issue 287 oil and
gas leases covering 145,063 acres of land in Montana. Wildearth
contended that the BLM’s decision to issue the leases in late 2017 and
early 2018 violated various requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). A Montana federal district court
agreed and vacated the leases.38
NEPA requires that federal agencies comply with several
procedural obligations before making decisions that may significantly
affect the quality of the human environment.39 One of these
36. E.g., Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 92 (Mont. 2020)
(references to “land surface” and “surface estate”).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–4–112 (2019) (“When used in any instrument, unless
the clear and express terms of the instrument provide otherwise, the term “minerals”
does not include fossils”).
38. Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2020 WL 2104760, at
*13 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
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obligations requires agencies to take a “hard look” at potential
environmental impacts. The BLM oil and gas leasing process is a set
of decisions subject to NEPA. The plaintiffs in this case asserted that
BLM failed to meet its NEPA obligations when it sold leases in several
planning areas in Montana.
The court identified several NEPA violations. First, the court
looked to several alleged impacts to groundwater from drilling and
fracking. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the BLM failed to
analyze the role shallow fracturing and surface casing depth would
play in spills and the potential effects to groundwater. The court found
no direct response to these complaints. Second, the court also found
that the BLM failed to comply with its obligation to evaluate
reasonable alternatives because it did not consider a measure to protect
“all usable groundwater zones.”40 The plaintiffs suggested that this
alternative was reasonable because it could be included in a lease
stipulation or notice requiring groundwater testing prior to drilling.
The court found the BLM’s proposed no surface occupancy alternative
did not respond to this concern.
Next, the court found that the BLM failed to meet its obligation to
consider “cumulative impacts” because it did not look at the
cumulative impacts to climate from the multiple lease sales. The court
recognized that individual leases may have a negligible impact on
climate, but “if BLM ever hopes to determine the true impact of its
projects on climate change, it can only do so by looking at projects in
combination with each other.”41 Lastly, the court concluded that
because the BLM prepared deficient environmental assessments, its
findings of no significant impact were also deficient.42 Based on these
violations, the court held that the standard in the Ninth Circuit required
it to vacate the leases as part of the remand to the bureau.43
B. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Bernhardt
In a decision issued shortly after Wildearth Guardians, the same
Montana federal district court judge ruled that an instructional
memorandum issued by the BLM in 2018 violated the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) and therefore provided
grounds to invalidate a number of oil and gas lease sales.44 The
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Wildearth Guardians, 2020 WL 2104760, at *6.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 WL
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FLPMA establishes the framework under which the BLM manages
public lands within its jurisdiction. The statute requires that public
land management protect “the quality of scientific, scenic, historical,
ecological,” and other environmental attributes.45 BLM complies with
this mandate by developing and implementing Resource Management
Plans to guide its decisionmaking.46 BLM also oversees the
competitive oil and gas leasing process on federal public lands.47
As part of these authorities, the BLM has undertaken a multi-state
planning effort to protect sage grouse due to concerns regarding the
impacts of it being listed as an endangered species. The BLM
designated areas of sage grouse habitat to be protected and directed its
field offices to give habitat protection priority in the oil and gas leasing
process. In 2016, the BLM issued an instruction memorandum to
implement this policy.
Following the change in administration, the BLM issued a revised
instruction memorandum. The revised memorandum stated that the
BLM no longer needed to prioritize sage grouse habitat in leasing
decisions. The BLM then sold oil and gas leases based upon the
revised memorandum. The plaintiffs challenged these decisions as
violations of FLPMA and other statutes. The court found that the
revised memorandum violated the BLM’s own sage grouse policy.
The court then found that the lease sales also violated FLMPA because
they were based upon an invalid memorandum. The court then vacated
the lease sales.
C. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for the
Storage of Natural Gas
A Montana federal district court judge adopted the findings and
recommendations of the United States magistrate judge as to three
motions for summary judgment regarding condemnation of surface
estate interests necessary to operate a natural gas storage field in
southeastern Montana.48 The Baker Storage Field operated as a natural
gas storage field in southeastern Montana since the 1940s. After the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the surface estate, not the mineral
2615631, at *9–10 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982).
47. 43 C.F.R. § 3120.3 (2019).
48. See WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for the Storage
of Nat. Gas in the Judith River Subterranean Geologic Formation, No. CV 18-88BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 4582025 (D. Mont. Aug. 10, 2020).
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estate, owns the pore space, the project operator, WBI Energy
Transmission, Inc. (“WBI”), had to negotiate leases with the various
surface owners within the storage field.
As reported in the last update, WBI filed a condemnation action
in federal district court under the Natural Gas Act for those properties
where it could not successfully negotiate leases.49 The defendants
counterclaimed based on trespass and other legal theories. The
counterclaims were dismissed as precluded under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 71.1—the procedural rule governing condemnation
cases.50 In subsequent rulings, the magistrate judge found that the
surface owners failed to produce an expert witness to testify as to the
market value of the interests condemned. The federal district court
agreed and awarded a nominal amount of $1.00 to each defendant.
IV. LEGISLATION
The Montana legislature meets for its regular session biannually in
odd numbered years.51 The legislature did not meet in 2020.

49. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for Storage of Nat.
Gas in Judith River Subterranean Geological Formation, No. CV 18-88-BLG-SPWTJC, 2019 WL 3470742, at *2 (D. Mont. July 8, 2019).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1.
51. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 6.

